Who does a better job of managing money: Republicans or Democrats? Under rational agent hypothesis, financial industry practitioners should not be affected by political discourse, and investors cannot realize abnormal returns on publicly available information. Rare events, however, may silence rationality and potentiate cognitive dissonance on a spectrum of agents. We assembled a comprehensive dataset of equity hedge funds performance and matched the managers' political affiliation by their partisan contributions. We document higher returns of funds managed by Democrats for 10 subsequent months-from December 2008 to September 2009. This result is unique and robust to placebo time windows and random partisan affiliation shuffling. We conjecture that the conjunction of the financial crisis, Obama's election, and politically polarized interpretation of the US central bank policy during that period had an asymmetric impact on hedge fund managers' perception. In other periods, when the political discourse did not involve central bank policy, there was no statistically significant difference in fund managers performance depending on their political beliefs.
Introduction
At the heat of the 2016 primary race for presidential nomination, Sir Michael Hintze-founder of a large British multi-strategy hedge fund-warned against predicting chaos and assured that the US political system is "strong enough to withstand whoever." 1 This statement could probably be applied to an analogous overreaction to Obama's first presidency, when Republican equity hedge fund managers-identified by private campaign contributions-underperformed their Democratic peers for an unprecedented period of 10 months straight.
Ideology is an important bias in the financial industry which is not usually factored in.
This study adds to the body of research on a variety of "irrational" factors in financial decisionmaking (Barber and Odean 2001; Shiller 2014 ). The partisan-based difference in the performance by hedge fund managers is an indication of the extent to which ideology can affect the processing of information and whose effects become salient during abnormal situations.
American equity hedge funds allocate clients' capital in US equities subject to constraints agreed to by the investors. These constraints may include the extent of exposure to the overall market moves (beta) and sector concentrations. Managers commonly have substantial discretion within these constraints on how to allocate the capital, and both beta and concentrations are subject to that discretion. The managers are compensated by receiving a percentage of the total returns of the fund over a benchmark plus a percentage of the capital under management.
Funds underperforming a benchmark are frequently closed early, since the managers lose the expectations of the performance-based fee and want to remove the poor performance from evaluation by prospective clients. 2 It is generally assumed that, although there is a difference 1 Mary Childs and Stephen Foley, "Hedge funds back Trump in expectation of pragmatic shift in tone," Financial Times, May 15, 2016.
2 See Bykhovsky (2011) for a discussion of the informational asymmetry that allows hedge fund managers between the principal's (investor's) and the agent's (manager's) utility functions, managers have sufficient incentives to deploy their full capabilities to maximize the fund's returns. Efficient market theory implies that the managers will utilize their training and all available information to maximize the fund's returns and that they will ignore irrelevant data.
The details of the US monetary policy, although scrupulously dissected by the professional classes, is rarely a subject of political rancor, much else for dramatically different interpretations of its expected effects by the political parties. The one exception was the period after Obama's election. While several expected policy actions-including quantitative easing operations undertaken by the US central bank-were viewed by the economic profession as largely consistent with what was understood at the time, there was an exceptionally wide partisan divide in their interpretation by the political parties. Republican commentators were prognosticating "hyperinflation" as a result of these policies and the subsequent debasement of the dollar, while the Democratic ones were either muted in their response or offered a defense for these policies.
Rational managers seeking to maximize their funds' returns would ignore these prognostications in their allocation decisions (Fama 1970; Fama 2014) . One should not expect to observe a difference of decisions by rational agents based on their own political preference. Yet, we have observed differences in funds' performance depending on the political preferences by the managers. These differences became salient during the period of intense partisan discussions about the central bank's policy, but not in any other periods.
We identified political preferences by the managers by their political contributions. Although it may be argued that they were attempting to buy policy or contributed for other reasons, the relatively small amounts of the contributions make expressing partisan preference the more likely explanation for contributing. (right graph). The correlation between managers' performance by partisan affiliation is strong (both plots are almost identical) for all periods, but the plots diverge at the end of 2008.
Upon closer inspection using monthly regressions, we find that the Democratic managers to shut down funds without loss in reputation. The paper proceeds as follows: In sections 2-4, we describe the data collection and matching, identification strategy, and main results. In section 5, we sketch a behavioral framework and narrative explanatory to our results. In section 6, we perform a series of robustness checks, including placebo time windows and randomized partisan affiliation. Section 7 discusses (and weakens) the possible alternative explanations of our results. Section 8 concludes and draws policy recommendations. We studied only US equity hedge funds; international and foreign funds were excluded.
Funds with keywords such as foreign country names, "emerging," "options," "international,"
3 See: https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/.
"derivative," "convertible," "global," and "private equity" in their strategy description were also excluded.
We assigned appropriate benchmarks (called "bogeys") to each fund based on the fund's strategy. For example, if the strategy is "Fundamental Growth" or description implies that the fund is mainly investing in growth stocks, then the S&P Total Return Growth Index was used as the bogey; if the strategy is "Fundamental Value" or description implies that the fund is mainly investing in value stocks, then S&P Total Return Value Index was used as the bogey.
If the main strategy is not included as above, such as "Multi-Strategy," or "Equity Market
Neutral," the bogey was set to be S&P Total Return Index.
We then used time series regressions to measure the market exposures as well as excess returns for each fund. Using the results from previous steps and a single-factor linear regression model, market exposure (beta) and excess return (alpha) were calculated for each fund.
Political Data
The Federal Election Commission through its Individual Contributor Search 4 reports contributions made by individuals, Native American tribes, partnerships, sole proprietorships, limited liability companies (LLCs), and contributions by the candidate to all political committees including Independent Expenditure-Only Political Committees (Super PACs) and Political
Committees with Non-Contribution Accounts (Hybrid PACs). The reports contain each contributor's name, location (city, state, and ZIP code), employer, committee name, date, and amount contributed.
We identified the political affiliation of fund managers by political contributions. It is very unlikely for a manager to contribute to a partisan campaign "strategically," e.g., against their beliefs with the aim of getting favors in the future. These contributions were relatively small and the contributors' base is wide. Therefore, we assume that contributions reveal true beliefs and partisan affiliation.
Matching
Using a Python script, we looked up hedge fund managers by name at the Federal Election
Commission's Individual Contributor Search. 
Identification Strategy
We dropped observations for which there was no performance calculated and focused on equity hedge funds, which constitute above 39% of our observations (see Table 1 ). Equity hedge fund managers are arguably the most talented and quickest to read market trends. Therefore, any change in their perception of the market will be promptly translated into their investment strategies. Table 2 presents the summary statistics of money manages' performance and affiliation.
The sample shows a large variance in terms of performance, but is balanced in terms of partisan affiliation, year (see Table 3 ), and state composition (see Table 4 and Figure 2 ).
The unconditional correlation between left-and right-wing managers is strong for all periods but several months from December 2008 to September 2009 (see Figure 1 ). Our hypothesis is that the conjunction of the financial crisis and politically polarized news during Return Index at time t, and is the error term.
Our variable of interest is the interaction term β 4 , which captures the effect of being a Democratic equity hedge fund manager during the informational shock in comparison to
Republican equity hedge fund managers.
Results
Tables 5 summarizes the results of our regressions. The strongest predictor of equity hedge fund managers is the S&P 100 Return Index-i.e., hedge fund managers hardly outperform the market. Overall, we find that Democratic equity hedge fund managers perform slightly better than Republican equity hedge fund managers and all equity hedge fund managers perform slightly better under a Democratic president (Model 1). 
Partisan Dissonance
In this section, we harness cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957) and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) to give a narrative to the significant difference in performance between Democratic and Republican equity hedge fund managers from December 2008 to September 2009.
Cognitive Dissonance Theory
Individuals tend to seek consistency among their cognitions (i.e., beliefs, opinions). When there is an inconsistency between observations and attitudes or behaviors (dissonance), unconscious changes take place to eliminate the dissonance: beliefs are adapted to match evidence or, more often, facts that do not match beliefs are silenced (Festinger 1957 ).
This mechanism is built in our minds to economize effort-i.e., it is too costly to internalize all new information without priors-and lower discomfort from the discrepancy between empirical evidence and past choices. Furthermore, individuals trade strong beliefs for rational behavior when there are weaker beliefs attached to the latter. For example, an anti-gun low-tax voter may be willing to silence her anti-gun beliefs for the advantage of low taxes.
The theory of cognitive dissonance has been applied to consumer behavior. For example, new car owners selectively notice advertisements that re-enforce the "efficacy" of their recent decision and reduce the uncertainty they feel about the wisdom of their choice (Erlich, Guttman, Schönbach, and Judson 1957) . Similarly, individuals adjust their beliefs about job risk to reduce dissonance (Akerlof and Dickens 1982) . A hedge fund manager's choice of a political party is arguably no less anxiety producing than the choice of a new car or job. Thus, political affiliation cannot be disregarded as an investment-evaluation factor.
Scholars have investigated the psychological foundations for investor behavior, focusing on price and return behavior to infer investor attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. Along these lines, mean reversion in stock prices can be interpreted as evidence of investor overreaction where investors overemphasize recent firm performance in forming future expectations (De Bondt and Thaler 1985) and excessive volatility in asset returns as suggestive of investing intense enthusiasm (Shiller, Fischer, and Friedman 1984) . Furthermore, irrational traders with erroneous stochastic beliefs can explain in part the equity premium puzzle (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann 1990) .
In previous sections, we offered direct evidence of how hedge fund managers' beliefs (based on their political contributions) affect performance. Our findings are consistent with the cognitive dissonance effect. There is evidence of (right-wing) media highlighting with persistency the risks of hyperinflation and bankruptcy from December 2008 and further into 2009 (see Figure   3 ). It is possible that, at that time, many Republicans for idealogical reasons adhered to the Relative Importance perspective of economic collapse, even when capital markets started to recover in early 2009.
During the same period, Democrats presented a moderate attitude and invested accordingly.
Prospect Theory
The rational theory of choice assumes description invariance: equivalent formulations of a choice problem should give rise to the same preference order (Arrow 1982) . There is strong evidence, however, that variations in the framing of options (e.g., in terms of gains or losses)
yield systematically different preferences (Tversky and Kahneman 1986 ). Tversky and Kahneman (1981) showed that framing the same problem in different ways produces asymmetric shifts of preference, depending on the psychological principles that govern the personal perception of decision problems and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes.
The fact that the formulation of decision problems-e.g., type of words, medium, and contextshifts preferences and risk perception, challenges the principle of invariance that underlies the rational theory of choice. 6 A similar critic to the rational theory of choice is posted by the psychophysics of chance, which induce overweighting of sure things and of improbable events relative to events of moderate probability (Kahneman and Tversky 1984) .
In a series of experiments, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) demonstrated a fourfold pattern of risk attitudes: (i) risk aversion for gains of moderate and high probability, (ii) risk seeking for losses of moderate and high probability, (iii) risk seeking for gains of small probability, and (iv) risk aversion for losses of small probability. Whether the partisan-based differential in the performance of the fund managers is related to the differentiation of their probability distributions or to different risk attitudes cannot be ascertained. The first seems to be the more likely, as there wasn't much difference in the managers' performance at other times, during which varying degrees of underlying uncertainty were present.
A Partisan Dissonance Story
The differences in personality between Democrats and Republicans in the US are well established (Lane 1955; Carney, Jost, Gosling, and Potter 2008; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, and Dowling 2012) . In general, liberals are more open-minded, creative, curious, and novelty seeking, whereas conservatives are more orderly, conventional, better organized, and risk-averse.
Distinct personality features lead to the development of biases that help manage information overflow, level cognitive dissonances, and simplify complicated decision-making situations. On the other hand, professionals (e.g., physicians, military officials, equity hedge fund managers)
are not "ordinary"; they are expected be proofed from facilitatory heuristics and are rewarded
for not yielding to their personality and biases. Therefore, there should not be significant differences between Democratic and Republican fund managers, as both types effectively manage their biases.
But professionals are not thoroughly bias-proofed. In an experiment involving 110 highly skilled professionals-engineers, scientists, and managers in a high-technology international engineering firm- Duchon, Dunegan, and Barton (1989) found that subtle changes in the frame of reference had a powerful effect on the perception of risk and R&D financial allocation decisions.
Based on cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957 ) and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) , the significant difference in performance between Democratic and Republican equity hedge fund managers from December 2008 to September 2009 can be recounted as follows:
(a) Professional equity hedge fund managers are considered to be bias-proofed; however, they may behave irrationally, particularly during tail events. 7
(b) The concurrence of the financial crisis, Obama's election to presidential office, 8 and the Fed's decisive monetary intervention was unexpected (low probability) in most scenarios.
(c) Even though the information available across equity hedge fund managers is similar, the screening of information and the weights managers put to low probability political events depends on their political affiliation.
(d) Right-wing media highlighted the risks of hyperinflation and bankruptcy after Obama's election and during his first months in office; Republicans overweighted the risk of collapse.
(e) In all other circumstances, the differences in risk perception were not strong enough to trigger cognitive dissonance and asymmetric estimation of probabilities.
Due to the nature of the data, we cannot replicate experimentally the events and circumstances that led to a divergence in performance by Democratic and Republican equity hedge fund managers. In the following sections, we give support to our narrative by excluding the chance of a random effect and weakening alternative causal channels.
Robustness
At the current state of the art, behavioral patterns are the "residual" explanation when rational explanations fail. In this section, we present several robustness tests that weaken or rule out alternative causal channels to the cognitive bias explanation presented above of Democratic equity hedge fund managers outperforming Republican their peers by 7.2% from December 2008 until September 2009.
Geographical Selection Biases
Our results could be driven by outlier states with an over-representation of managers of one party that outperform (Democrats) or underperform (Republican) compared to the mean by partisan affiliation. To address this issue, we rerun our regression only for states with large and balanced representation of both equity hedge fund managers affiliated with both parties. Table   6 presents results for equity hedge fund managers from CA, CT, FL, IL, MA, NJ, NY, PA, TX, and VA; Table 7 shows results narrowed to managers located in CA, CT, IL, MA, NY, and TX (arguably, states with a sophisticated financial infrastructure). Our results remain stable (or are even stronger) when we narrow the geographical scope to states with large and politically balanced representation.
A perfect experiment would randomly assign equity hedge fund managers to different 
Mixed "Purple" Teams
By design, we restricted our analysis to funds for which managers were univocally identified as one-sided partisan; i.e., we did not analyze funds for which managers contributed to more than one party. The case of a selection bias could potentially arise: It may be that the best Republican equity hedge fund managers are in teams with Democratic managers, so their results are not captured in our estimates.
We now turn to mixed teams and construct a variable Democratic Affiliation Ratio equal to the number of identified Democratic managers minus the number of identified Republican
Managers, divided by the number of identified partisan managers. Thus, our variable runs from −1 for strictly Republican teams to +1 for strictly Democratic teams.
Since most of the funds in our sample are strictly Democratic or Republican (see the left histogram in Figure 4 ) which we analyzed in Sections 3 and 4, we drop strictly partisan teams and focus on the Democratic Affiliation Ratio between −1 and +1 (see the right histogram in Figure 4 ). To capture the effect of mixed partisan teams in politically polarized periods, we regress of the following specification: P erf ormance j,t = α + β 1 DEM ratio no shock j,t + β 2 DEM ratio no shock 2 j,t +β 3 DEM ratio shock j,t + β 4 DEM ratio shock 2 j,t + β 5 S&P 100 Return t + (2) where Performance j,t is the monthly return of fund j at time t, DEM ratio (no) shock j,t is the ratio of Democratic managers-as described above-in fund j at time t during "(no) shock" periods, S&P 100 Return t is the S&P 100 Return Index at time t, and is the error term. We use added square terms to the ratio of Democratic managers to capture eventual non-linearities, e.g., that balanced teams achieve better results than mixed teams.
Results presented in Table 8 show that there is no differential effect of mixed teams when there are more Democratic or Republican members in their composition.
Placebo Time Windows
The identified 10-month period between December 2008 and September 2009 could have had homologous periods. If our time window is not unique, we should then expect similar results for other time windows of similar duration. We run our most restrictive regression-which included state and fund status fixed effects, as well as clustering standard errors at the fundlevel (see Table 5 TheŠidák adjusted p-value for our estimate of interest equals 1 − (1 − p-value) n = 1 − (1 − .0002488) 180 = .043797; the mean p-value of the remaining windows is .9459, with a standard deviation of .1709, and minimum of .116. Analogously, the Bonferroni adjusted p-value for our estimate of interest equals min(1, p-value × n) = min(1, .0002488 × 180) = .0447795; the mean p-value of the remaining windows is .9636, with a standard deviation of .1447, and minimum of .124. Relative Returns statistically significant.
Partisan Affiliation Shuffling
We performed Monte Carlo simulations, shuffling partisan affiliation in different ways. In the first simulation, we randomly replaced half of Democratic managers with Republican managers, thus each group resulted in a balanced mix of Democratic and Republican equity hedge fund managers as the members of the initial groups (with a ±1% tolerance). We then run our preferred regression (as in Table 5 As expected, random treatment groups with equally shuffled partisan affiliations do not show significant differences from random control groups. The mean of the interaction coefficient is 0.018, with a standard deviation of 0.21. Only 16 observations (1.6%) showed coefficients higher than 0.5 at a 1% significance level. The combined probability of an estimate as high and significant as in our baseline estimation, shown in Model 5 in Table 5 To confirm these results, we next run a similar simulation, allowing for a random ratio of partisan switches. Whereas previously the replacement ratio was 1/2, in this simulation a Democratic ratio equal to zero means that all Democratic equity hedge fund managers where replaced by Republicans, and a ratio of 1 means that all Democrats remain "truly Democrats" in the treatment group and vice versa. Finally, we randomly replaced half of Democratic managers with Republican managers in each month; i.e., we allowed half of the managers to artificially "switch" affiliations each month. We run this procedure 10,000 times, randomly re-shuffling partisan affiliation. Figure 8 shows the Kernel distribution and cumulative density functions of the interaction coefficient of to not show significant differences. The mean of the interaction coefficient is 0.013, with a standard deviation of 0.158. Only 18 observations (0.18%, i.e., less than two in one thousand) showed coefficients higher than 0.5 at a 1% significance level, and none (zero) was as high and significant as in our baseline estimation shown in Model 5 in Table 5 .
The results of these simulations provide support that the significant difference in performance between Democratic and Republican equity hedge fund managers observed from December 2008 to September 2009 was not by chance or driven by outliers, but can be attributed to characteristics related to the partisan affiliation of the managers. Also, the optimistic attitude of Democrats may have been reinforced by source dependence. 11 In the case at hand, Democratic equity hedge fund managers may have felt more competent when the political and policy decision-making center is closer to their beliefs.
Again, there is no evidence of this matter. There is no correspondence between control in Congress (see Figure 10 ) and the number of consecutive months when equity hedge fund managers affiliated with one political party outperformed their peers from the other political party (cf. Figure 5) . On the contrary, the other significantly long period of performance 11 I.e., people often prefer a bet on a vague probability event in their area of competence over a bet on a matched chance clear probability event, which is related to the attribution of credit and blame (Heath and Tversky 1991) . 
Timely Optimism
The observed results could also be interpreted in a very narrowed way-as optimism of Democrats when their candidate was in power, combined with a lucky strike of markets recovering in early 2009. Should the president had been a Republican or markets had not recovered, the aftermath could have been different. I.e., in both cases the evidence shows that managers performed opposite to what a timely optimistic bias would suggest. Under Republican presidential leadership, Republican equity hedge fund managers performed worse after risky events than their Democratic counterparts.
Fund Flows
It is possible that fund managers where not politically biased, but investors were. After Obama's election, maybe Republican investors panicked and withdrew funds, forcing funds into fire sales that accounted for the difference in performance.
This explanation seems unlikely for several reasons. First, it would require a perfect alignment of thousands of Republican and Democratic investors in different funds. These funds are similar in their investor composition and investors often pool funds in more than one fund. Second, it would require that Republican investors be matching to Republican-run funds; otherwise, Democratic fund managers may arguably advise against selling, particularly if their profit and reputation are at risk. Third, it would require that funds' lockup requirements and withdrawal restrictions do not apply to the same extend to Democratic and Republican equity hedge funds. We do not have the monthly historical record of assets under management by fund to test how flows reacted in the analyzed period. From the global data and talks with hedge funds, there were portfolio realignments, but it does not seem that there was an asymmetric withdraw from hedge funds (i.e., some funds fire selling and other withholding their positions).
In any case, if Republican investors (which we cannot identify due to confidentiality of data) investing in funds run by Republican managers fire sold on the onset of the Obama presidency, this would move the weight of the cognitive dissonance effect from fund managers to investors, but would still be in line with the mechanism.
Conclusions
We document a large, significant, and lasting higher returns of Democratic equity hedge fund managers compared to their Republican peers from December 2008 to September 2009. The difference in performance is robust to several regression specifications, placebo time windows, and randomly shuffled partisan affiliation. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that, given the $380 billion in equity hedge funds' assets under management in 2009, 12 the estimated 72 basis points difference in monthly performance between Democratic and Republican managers accrued $13.7 billion in relative losses for investors in funds managed by the later.
We argue that the divergence in political parties' interpretation of central bank policy following Obama's election sparked a difference in decision-making under cognitive dissonance.
Rationally, both Democratic and Republican managers were equally aware of the political need to offer differing interpretations by the parties, and both should have ignored them. While all equity hedge fund managers were exposed to the same data, managers' investment decisions were affected by the framing dominant in their politically affine circles. The argument that the managers have intrinsically differing risk preferences is not supported in other uncertain times: When there was no such interpretation divergence, their fund performance was roughly similar.
We showed that partisan affiliation is an important bias in the financial industry, which was not considered during the financial crisis and recovery. The difference in performance by hedge fund managers is an indication of the extent to which ideology can affect the processing of information and whose effects become salient during abnormal situations. Analogously to portfolio disclosures mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act, partisan contributions and affiliation should also be subject to mandatory disclosure.
Cognitive dissonance appears to be a very important driver, even for highly trained professionals, with more work to be done on the topic in other decision-making areas and on the methods to lower its impact. 
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